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Introduction
The application of rigid, seemingly stoic theories to religious practices is
controversial and at times offensive; however there is insight into the realm of religious
behavior that can be gained through the application of sociological and economic
exploration. Since Laurence Iannaccone’s seminal article in 1994, “Why strict churches
are strong,” the focus of economic literature has revolved around the concept of utility
maximization, which examines behaviors and choices through the lens of club theory,
and how the maximum net benefits of religion for members of a congregation can be
produced. However, most models constrain the discussion to extreme ends of strictness:
strict-sectarian churches, or religious groups so lenient that they require no sacrifices of
their members at all. This leaves a large gap in the club theory of religion as such
extremes hardly represent the true ecosystem in the religious market. The economic
models can explain the extremes well, but cannot account for success of moderate
religious groups, and most notably, a class of congregations called megachurches.
Megachurch is not a pejorative term; it is a term that describes a class of
Protestant congregations with over 2,000 members in weekly attendance. Megachurches
are thriving in the religious market because they are able to draw in large numbers of
members, and retain high levels of commitment. These congregations are able to make
God accessible, and membership in the organization desirable to a diverse group by
offering a variety of ministries and activity groups that engage and serve their
membership more effectively than their mainstream counterparts.
Apart from the business savvy and marketing abilities of these congregations,
there is an often overlooked, deeper level of commitment exhibited by both the
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membership and the organization that leads to the success of such large groups, even
when they exceed their theoretical optimal size, and expose themselves to the hampering
effects of congestion and free riding as club theory predicts. However, despite predicted
challenges, megachurches continue to grow. The simplifying conditions and constraining
models described in the economics of religion have written off a fundamental factor
driving an individual’s and organization’s choices and behaviors. The theories ignore the
theological underpinnings that influence tastes and preferences, as well as a church’s
theological driving force for growth that ought to be reckoned with. By acknowledging
the religious aspects of an organization, their behavior will be more predictable, and
oddities observed will be less surprising.
The success of megachurches, typically with low expectations for members raises
some doubts about the universality of strong churches needing to be strict. This paper
discusses possible choices that are likely to be considered by individual consumers and
congregations, and what drives the continual growth of a model congregation resulting in
the formation of a megachurch. Possible shifters of an individual’s given tastes and
preferences will be discussed, as well as the organizational structure and product
differentiation congregations choose in order to attract and retain members. I will argue
that the level of product differentiation in megachurches is great enough to induce
members who are marginally attached to other denominations to switch and join the
nondenominational congregation. As the congregation grows, the benefit of membership
continues to grow, further increasing incentives for new members to join, reducing the
total transitional cost of switching for members coming from other denomination.
Megachurches are then able to maintain large congregations by appropriately
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differentiating, and adapting to the demand of the membership and community to
effectively offer desirable services and efficiently grow. In doing so, the megachurch is
able to successfully attract and retain members with a strategy and organizational form
that both supports the current membership, and maintain proper incentives that foster
innovation in order to overcome significant challenges such as congestion and the pitfall
of rapidly declining marginal benefits per member.
The mission of a church is enveloped by doctrine, and is the reason for its
existence. Disregarding it for the sake of simplification may not prove useful for
understanding the outcomes from rational choice. Rational predictions of club behavior
are oversimplified, and I believe that by reapplying the factors of belief as an inherent
characteristic of behavior, a simpler understanding of the megachurch phenomenon can
be reached.
Literature Review
The secularization of the modern world has been an anticipated event since
sociologists like Max Weber brought more attention to the secularization thesis. The
theory suggests that as modern society’s understanding of science and rationality grows,
there will be a “disenchantment of the world”. However, the opposite is occurring. The
religious environment in the United States is vibrant and thriving rather than withering
away. Rates of religious belief show no sign of decline, and church membership has
risen consistently for the past two centuries.1
Not only has religious attendance grown, but so has the megachurch phenomenon.
From 2000 to 2005, the number of megachurches in the United States has doubled.2
1
2

Iannaccone, 1998
Ruhr, and Daniels, 2010
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Attendance at megachurches has risen 57%, from an average of 2,279 to 3,585.3 It is
evident that in the marketplace of Christianity, megachurches are competing with other
churches and denominational styles to attract and retain members, and are successfully
overcoming the organizational challenges associated with large congregations.
Laurence Iannaccone (1994) used a club model to describe the behavior and
success of strict protestant denominations. He argues that an individual’s private
benefits are, in part, a function of the participation of other members in the
congregation. For that reason, strict churches4 have an advantage over liberal-mainline
denominations because they are able to limit free riders. Eliminating free riders, by
maintaining high expectations of commitment and participation, results in strong
denominations with high levels of participation, increasing the benefits of all remaining
members.
The economic analysis of religion began with Adam Smith in 1776 with The
Wealth of Nations. He argued that self-interest motivates clergy and that market forces
constrain churches just as they do any other firms.5 Since Smith’s first look, the
economics of religion has developed and taken on a variety of forms beyond simple
direct comparison.
Club theory is of particular interest because of the nature of a religious
organization. Sociologists Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge offer a helpful
definition for the religious organization that takes into account its unique product set. “A
religious organization is a social enterprise whose distinctive purpose is to create,
3

Thumma, Travis, and Bird, 2005
Strict churches are congregations that have high full prices of membership, while mainline
denominations are those that are not in high tension with society, and therefore have lower full
costs of membership.
5
Iannaccone 1998
4
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maintain, and exchange supernaturally based general compensators.” Compensators are
the distinct products of religious organizations for which there are no direct secular
substitutes.6 Club theory applies to religious organizations because members, or
consumers of religion, are simultaneously suppliers and producers.7 Beyond their club
structure and collective production, there is added complexity because religious
congregations are mutual benefit organizations supported by voluntary donations, which
is a rare combination in the nonprofit sector.8
Iannacconne (1994) describes how the strictness of a religion leads to strength in
congregations. He argues that an individual member’s benefit is a function, not only of
an individual’s own belief but includes the commitment and participation of other
congregants. As evidence of this, he points to the fall of the mainline Christian
denominations and the rise of the strict evangelical denominations. The claim is that a
strict church will mitigate free rider problems if it imposes higher costs on its
membership, increasing the full price of membership enough so that those with low levels
of commitment will leave, resulting in increased net benefit for the remaining
congregants.
It is assumed that to minimize free riders, and to maximize the net benefits to the
committed members of the church, a church would choose to be strict in orientation.
Strictness is required because the religious product is a public good that is produced
collectively by the members of the congregation. Free rider problems arise because each
member of the church receives an average amount of the total product of the
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Miller 2002, Stark and Bainbridge 1987
Miller, 2002
8
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congregation, rather than in proportion to their individual effort.9 Iannaccone’s argument
assumes that there is an optimal level of strictness a congregation can choose to employ
as tool to discourage free riding and marginally attached members from joining the
congregation. This serves to maximize the average spiritual output of the congregation
and increase the utility of the committed members. High cost of membership is a way to
reach an optimal congregational size, so that the last member to join will not decrease the
net benefits of the congregation’s spiritual production, and will maximize the total value,
as depicted in figures 1.1 and 1.2.

9

ibid
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Raising the price of membership is accomplished by “increasing the cost of non-group
activities, such as socializing with members of other churches or pursuing secular past
times”10. Examples include imposing certain expectations on members’ diet, dress, or
behavior such as the ban on alcohol in Mormonism or strict social protocols with some
ultraconservative Baptist groups that serve to increase the full price of religious
adherence. These seemingly unproductive behaviors are in fact beneficial because they
induce the membership to deviate from social norms, requiring self-sacrifice, creating
stigmatization for the group, and raising the full price of membership. This is a tool for
selecting only the most dedicated members, and maintaining the congregation near the
10

Iannaccone, 1994
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optimal N* size, in order to maximize the MB of the last member. The demanding
behaviors characteristic of particular groups are also productive because as well as
creating high costs, the stigmas associated with a group build and enhance group
cohesion through common norms, and also serve as a tool to discriminate between
marginally attached members who may be unwilling to participate in the particular
behavior, and the truly devout members. This sort of behavior is thought to increase
average rates of participation, raise commitment, and enhance net benefits of the
membership, thus strengthening the church by mitigating free rider problems.11
The theory of dogmatic rigidity and behavioral incentives in churches has been
very influential in the economics and sociology of religion. Iannaccone again builds on
this theory, and highlights that fact that “throughout the world, fast growing religions
tend to be strict…”12. He claims that “virtually every measure of religious involvement,
or commitment- beliefs, attendance, and contributions- correlates positively with the
denomination’s overall level of conservatism, strictness, or sectarianism”13. This
however is predicated on the assumption that donative support on the part of members is
a proxy for the commitment, satisfaction, and strength of the congregation. Stark and
Finke broaden the concept of strictness and instead discuss denominations in terms of
exclusivity, and the level of tension that exists with society.14 Iannaccone orders
protestant denominations from liberal (Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist and the United
Church of Christ) to moderate (Reformed Church, American Baptist, Catholic,
Evangelical Lutheran and Disciples of Christ) and conservative (Southern Baptist,
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Quaker, and Missouri Synod Lutheran) to ultra-conservative (Assemblies of God,
Seventh Day Adventist, Mormon and Jehovah's Witness), and highlights the fact that the
strict denominations are growing, while the more liberal mainline denominations have
been in decline.15
Table 1.Changes in Protestant denominational growth.

Denomination Type

Change in
denominational size,
1940-2000

Mainline:
Methodist
Presbyterian
Episcopal
Church of Christ
Christian Church

-56%
-60%
-51%
-66%
-79%

Evangelical:
Southern Baptist
Chruch of God
Assemblies of God
Pentecostal

37%
1292%
221%
2375%

Other:
Latter-Day Saints
Jehovah’s Witness

157%
200%

Membership trends from 1940 to 2000 of the largest denominational groups. Large mainline
denominations have suffered losses, while evangelical denominations have been continuously
gaining members. However, there has not been an overall decline in religiosity.16

Rather than strictly discussing costs and benefits, Stark and Finke (2000) assume
that individuals act “within the limits of their information and understanding, restricted
by available options, guided by their preferences and tastes, [and] attempt to make
rational choices”17, and broaden the possible considerations individuals may undertake by
15

Iannaccone, 1994
Statistics from The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.
17
Stark and Finke, 2000
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considering tastes and preferences, and how those factors may change and develop. In
their view of religious production, religious explanations are distinctive because they
provide ways of attaining infinite value, in a supernatural context.18 Therefore, people
will continue to demand religion because it is the only possible supplier of spiritual
goods, since posthumous rewards are the major source of religious motivation, so
omitting religious beliefs from any model that seeks to provide insight into the behavioral
characteristics of organizations and individuals who are religious motivated should be
considered a serious error.
Starke and Finke (2005) recognize that strictness is not the sole factor determining
success, as Iannaccone seems to imply, but it is a necessary component for
denominational vitality. They note “religious groups must find ways of adapting to everchanging environments, without compromising their core religious beliefs. They must
produce organizational innovations without compromising faith”19. The argument is that
as a congregation grows, and develops into a “proper” denomination, it naturally will
professionalize, and organize itself in a certain way. As long as that organizational form
does not compromise the core values and beliefs of the faithful (i.e. liberalize too much),
the church can continue to grow because there will still be strong attachment with the
faith. If, however, the organization decides to try and expand in a way that lowers the
attachment of the faithful, by altering doctrine significantly (or secularizing), the church
will be too closely aligned with mainline society and misaligned with the membership.
Members are no longer receiving the same benefits of membership, and the decline of the
denomination will begin. This is what Stark and Finke argue is the cause of the decline
18
19

ibid
ibid
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of the liberal-mainline denominations. The occurrence just described reminiscent of the
sect-church process, wherein there are constant renewals, schisms, and new religious
movements produced from existing churches as organizations liberalize, alienate
members, and allow development of newly formed organizations to fill niches left by the
drifting mainline denominations. Though new religious organizations are formed, they
are closely related to the existing denominations. The new movements, or sects, tend to
stress fundamentals of the denominational theology from which they came, hence the
term fundamentalists.
Religious capital, which is similar to human capital, is an important factor when
people make decisions, and may play a role in why spin-off groups tend to be similar to
their original denominational identities. Iannaccone defines religious capital as “the
skills and experiences specific to one’s religion including religious knowledge,
familiarity with church ritual and doctrine, and friendship with fellow worshipers”.20
When people make decisions that will affect levels of religious capital, they will act in a
way to minimize the loss of their personal stock of religious capital.21 This works well
with observed trends, since new religious groups tend to split with a mainline
denomination but remain very similar in overall beliefs. 28% of Americans leave the
religion they were raised in, and 16% of which have changed from one type of
Protestantism to another, which suggests that when people switch religions or
denominations, they tend to move within the same family of religion (Pew Forum).
Ruhr and Daniels highlight the growing importance of religious switching in their
analysis of the growth of megachurches. They argue that megachurches are significantly
20
21
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different from traditional churches and denominations because they “often have a flexible
and modern look, downplay denominational affiliation, and employ otherwise secular
activities in their programming” as well as encouraging new attendees without early
commitment or affiliation.22 Their argument is that “megachurches initially reduce the
full price of membership to bring [new members] to the church, but are later able to
increase the full price for those that have found a good fit between their needs and what
the megachurch offers” and become full members.23 They discuss how megachurches
offer a price of membership that is initially low by not demanding participation in
activities, or donations of time or money from the potential new member. This allows
religious seekers to express interest and try out the church, but as affiliation strengthens
and the individual is baptized and officially joins the church, full price of membership is
increased. This seems to be a reordering of the traditional logic. Rather than weeding out
marginally attached members and only leaving the most committed, Ruhr and Daniels
stress the development of the new member into one that will eventually participate fully
in the congregation.
Discussion
The highly restrictive theories offer insight into the overly complicated market place
of Christianity as a whole, but these same theories are not very useful for describing one
of the largest congregational movements in modern Christianity, the megachurch. The
evolution of the megachurch is incredibly interesting because it seems to defy the
generally accepted theories of strictness and congestion within religious organizations. In
order to grow to such a large size, reaching over 1 million members in the case of Yoido
22
23
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Full Gospel Church in South Korea, a congregation must develop and refine an
organizational approach that allows it to overcome the difficulties club theory predicts
would plague traditional congregations.
This paper examines the choices that individuals face when seeking a
congregation, and how megachurches are organized to attract and maintain members.
The idealized example megachurch is an organization with a particular theological
doctrine, but one that is marketed in a nondenominational manner. This
nondenominational status serves to remove the social tension or stigma associated with
any particular denominational identity. Nondenominational status also allows former
members of other denominations to transfer some of the religious capital gained from
past religious training, further lowering the price of membership for potential new
members. It is also assumed that individuals face choices, and act in a way to maximize
their private benefit. The megachurch is thought of as a distinctive denomination of its
own; as such the megachurch has complete autonomous control over its behavior, and
can allocate resources as it sees fit in order to react to various market pressures quickly
and continue to grow and reach new members. It is also assumed that the organization is
structured in a way where there is transparency between the members and “clergy”24 as to
avoid principal-agent problems within the congregation.
Choice and Rationality
What is it that determines the conversion and later commitment of an individual?
Iannaccone’s theoretical work in “Why strict churches are strong” suggests that as the
cost of religious membership in a congregation increases, so do the net gains to the
24

Clergy is used loosely to describe the individuals leading the organization. Most megachurches
do not have theologically trained leaders, in the traditional sense, but instead rely on founding
pastors or volunteer leaders from within the congregation.
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membership as a whole.25 Assuming religion is a commodity good that is collectively
produced, the relative high cost of religious membership should serve to maximize the
production of religious benefits by maximizing the average product for members. By
increasing the cost of membership, the congregation would prevent freeriding, thereby
increasing an individual’s participation in the collective production of the good, yielding
an increased supply by limiting the makeup of the congregation to a more committed
group of members. An example of this can be a person’s enjoyment at a particular
service; if a person’s experience is related to how full the congregation is, and the general
membership’s enthusiasm, participation and perceived commitment, then implementing
costs that raise factors related to enjoyment will be worthwhile as they serve to increase
the average enjoyment, confidence and commitment of the congregation.
But, one must first become a member in order to receive the full benefits of
belonging to the congregation. Some benefits an individual may consider are network
benefits, and the sense of community that membership provides. The value of such a
network is related to the size of the congregation, the qualities of the membership, and
the values and beliefs of the group. The size of the network is also important because the
larger the membership, the more authority the group has in its relationship with society as
a whole. For example, the Catholic Church and its membership are not in high tension
with the general population, and devout followers are simply considered religious,
however Scientology is considered a cult, and its members are often mocked for certain
beliefs because the group has not gained acceptance by mainstream society as a
legitimate religion. Another factor relating to the value of the network is how similar an
individual’s values, and tastes and preferences are to the group. If the person values
25

Iannaccone 1994
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diversity and the opportunity for discussion with different points of view, a larger and
more liberal congregation may be a better fit than a smaller more homogenous group.
Individuals engage in religious behavior because they expect rewards at some
point. If someone decides to participate, there are benefits that flow from religious
activities, either personal fulfillment, which includes posthumous rewards, or in the form
of social benefit and interactions. The readiness to bear religious costs needs to be
compared to the expectations created by particular theologies. Economists often stress
the concept of marginal cost being equal to marginal benefit, so it should be reasonable
for religious beliefs to be included when evaluating the behavior of decisions involving
the religiously inclined, especial megachurches, since they are organizations based on
promotion of religious beliefs.
Motivation: Personal and Organizational
Intrinsic religious commitment is the motivation for experiencing and living one’s
religious faith for the sake of the faith itself. The person’s religion is an end unto itself, a
goal pursued in the absence of external reinforcement.
(Gorsuch, 1994)
Individuals are assumed to be utility maximizers, matching potential benefits with
their tastes and preferences. Individual behavior and decision-making, as discussed by
Lavric and Flere, laid out a scheme where individuals are religiously motivated by two
sets of factors, intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic factors are the personal motives like faith,
while extrinsic factors such as the psychological and social benefits of belonging to a
congregation, are more overtly utilitarian. The extrinsic motivations describes ways in
which the member “uses” their religion as a tool to gain benefits, either psychological in
the case of support and personal development groups or through involvement in social
activities within the congregation, and taking advantage of network externalities.
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A particular theological disposition influences a persons decision making process
by acting as a reference point and is a way to rationalize particular behaviors and
judgments. Behaviors vary from person to person and can be influenced by religious
beliefs, so theological rationalizations of behavior is a constraint that should be
considered when evaluating individuals’ characteristics, as well as an organizational
constraints. Faithful individuals will exhibit an innate, self-generated set of tastes that
will manifest themselves in the choices and actions a person chooses or undertakes.
Unlike extrinsic motives, intrinsic motives are sets of characteristics that are
related to the innate spirituality of the person, meaning the religious nature of an
individual is taken as a given and is a variable that influences the persons tastes and
preferences for other possible choices (i.e. the balance of “pure religion” versus the social
offerings of a congregation). Furthermore, intrinsic religious levels need not be
homogenous across a congregation; megachurches can draw from both pools of devout
spiritual seekers as well as the loosely attached social-church-goers by offering a variety
of services and activities, and allowing the members to self-select into their groups of
choice.
Organizational behavior is also influenced by theological constraints. A church will
no doubt be subject to material constraints just as any other firm will be in the market;
however, a church also faces theological constraints just as the members do. These
constrains drive the church to grow, as there is a strong incentive for evangelization:
“Nor is there salvation in any other, for there is no other name under
heaven given among men by which we must be saved.” (Acts 4:12)
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“Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations…teaching them to observe all
things that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even to the end of
the age.” (Matthew 28:19-20)

This theological drive to grow, exemplifies in the previous biblical quotes, is evident in
the statements of belief of many congregations; it is central to a church’s mission to
connect people with their savior and religion’s focal point, and to do so, the organization
must grow by adapting and devoting resources to expand in order to meet the needs of the
current membership, and also find ways of reaching out to potential new members. This
sort of behavior can be seen when congregations expand current locations or by opening
satellite ministries. The expansion strategy helps megachurches increases total
membership while avoiding congestion at any particular site, while maintaining a single
identity. Churches that tend to set up satellite congregations are also likely to help
“plant” or start congregations that are separate from their own.26 Church planting, i.e.
creating competition, is counterintuitive for a firm in the traditional mindset of revenue
maximization or those in competition for the most members, but may be an altruistically
motivated action on the part of the organization and its members possibly reflective of
their religious motivations. This motive can be explained if there is a genuine interest of
growing for “a cause” as opposed to strictly for self-benefit. Church expansion need not
be spatial growth though, as most megachurches will first begin to offer multiple
services.

26

Thumma, and Bird, 2008, page 8
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Table 2. Mean attendance, sanctuary size, and services for Megachurches
Weekend
Sanctuary
Attendance Size
2000
2005
2008

3,857
3,585
4,142

2,040
1,709
1,794

Services
Held
4.3
4.4
5.3

Mean megachurch attendance has increased, but the mean sanctuary seating
available has not, instead there number of services held has increased.27
Instead of expanding to multiple locations or providing more room for members
in the sanctuary, there has been growth in the weekend services held by megachurches.
By offering more services, the megachurch can not only accommodate more people;
there is also the opportunity to offer more variety in the services. By offering more
variety of services, the congregation can reach a broader group of people by catering to
different preferences in worship style. In 2008, 60% of megachurches looked at by
Thumma and Bird had multiple worship services, and said that they offered alternative
services that were different in style from their main service. This altering of style shows
that the megachurches are innovating, and this innovation has so far been associated with
higher attendance and rapid growth.

Table 3. Services Offered By Megachurches versus Non-Megachurches
Megachurch
Non-Megachurch
P-Value

Friday
0.248
0.187
0.239

Saturday
0.714
0.22
0.000

Sunday AM
2.645
1.221
0.000

Sunday PM
0.787
0.559
0.000

Results from data analyzed by Ruhr and Daniels (2010) show that for Saturday,
and Sunday morning and afternoon, megachurches offer more services than nonmegachurch congregations.

27

Ibid, page 6
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By expanding the number of services, the congregations can temporarily avoid the
problem of congestion that would otherwise become a limiting factor. If the sole purpose
of the congregation were to maximize the utility by ensuring the greatest possible output
of a congregation, the incentives would be aligned such that the church would have high
costs of admission in order to keep membership restricted so that the smaller group would
receive higher average benefits from their congregation. But, by taking into account the
theological inclination towards growth and expansion, it is not surprising that the
congregations seek to operate in a way to maximize total membership, and more
impressively, the expansion of the religion as a whole by helping other churches start up.
The congregations open their arms to the communities they are in by proving a wide
array of ministries and social opportunities, as seen below in table 4. Megachurches are
far more likely to offer secular services to their members than traditional congregations
are:
Table 4. Percent of Congregations Providing Secular-Based Group Activities
Type of Group
Community Service
Parenting/ Marriage Enrichment
Choir
Performing Arts
Book Discussions
Self-help
Fitness
Sports Teams
Youth Groups
Young Adult Activities

Megachurch
89%
88%
90%
90%
71%
88%
77%
83%
91%
88%

Traditional
66%
29%
58%
45%
30%
30%
18%
26%
68%
35%
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The groups in table 4 seem to be constructed in a way that they target specific
audiences, and groups of people, not only in terms of composition (e.g. young adults
ministry) but also by targeting these groups and catering to specific preferences and
offering small group experiences along with the large congregational worship services.
This type of behavior and success is inconsistent if the framework of analysis is built on
the notion that strict churches are stronger than more moderate congregations seeking to
cater to the masses. Instead, the integration of theology as an organizational constraint
should be introduced as a way to examine the incentives and behavior of religious
groups.
“When people feel comfortable, they STAY.
When people stay, they CONNECT.
When people connect, they ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS.
Relationship cultivates INFLUENCE.
Influence will CHANGE LIVES.”
From The Stay Café at Life Center Church, Tacoma Wa.

This above inscription from is a great example of the guiding principles of the
religious nature of a megachurch. The organization is structured in ways that help
promote the greater Christian mission of promoting salvation for all. Megachurches offer
a variety of experiences, including secular ones in a way that promotes religious
socialization. Most megachurches are also nondenominational in appearance to have
generic evangelical appeal. These are ways to help people feel comfortable and enjoy the
time spent with the congregation. The congregation also extensively uses small groups as
a way to form connections between the members, no matter their intrinsic religious
intensity. These adaptations have allowed socially moderate congregations disregarded
by traditional economics of religion to succeed. The megachurch organizational style
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seems to have developed methods of overcoming congestion and free riding by
embracing the factors that cause the problems in the first place. Congestion should only
be a problem if the membership is homogenous, but by offering variety and seeking a
diverse membership, megachurches can avoid this issue by providing variety in both
groups and worship styles. Free riding can be handled by simply being disregarded. If
the group is truly religiously motivated, all people will be welcome, regardless of their
intrinsic religious level, which is consistent with the organizational approach of the
megachurch phenomenon, and developmental history. The all-or-nothing viewpoint of
religious participation is inappropriate when the end-goal is to “influence and change
lives”, and a by-product of this shift could be the recent movement to self-generated
religion and the high percentage of religious fluidity seen in the American population.
Conclusion
Religious beliefs are often written off by academics as either a variable that must
be controlled for or as an irrational emotional attachment, either of which ought to be
removed from the discussion of economic theories even when pertaining to organizations
inherently theological in nature. If religious beliefs are simply characteristics that are to
be disregarded, there is a limit to what can be gained from studying megachurches.
However, if religious beliefs are instead viewed as important dogmatic aspects that guide
peoples’ lives, then that emotional connection is not as random or irrational as one might
initially assume. From the perspective of a believer, their religious beliefs are true and
absolute, and will often form the foundation of their outlook on life and the decisions
they make. Though their decisions may seem irrational or even bizarre to those not of the
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same mindset, their dogma provides a rational basis for their behavior. Specific actions,
odd to others, can be logically traced back to their theological roots and explained.
If understood, and given adequate importance, glimpses of the basis of certain
peoples’ thought process can be seen, and information that was written off can be used to
provide a fuller explanation for the behavior of megachurches. Though most
megachurches are known to have few if any religious symbolism and weak
denominational affiliations, they are still Christian organizations nonetheless. They
provide a center of worship, regardless of style, and also provide many nonreligious
services to their members. These nonreligious services, ranging from counseling to
athletic activities, serve to improve their relevance to the mainstream population and
allow for the organization to reach a broader spectrum of people than they might have
otherwise.
The megachurch, as a distinct institution style, is separate from the “normal”
congregational or organizational motifs that are generally discussed in club theory. They
are a relatively new organizational style, and have just begun to grow into prominence in
mainstream society. As they grow, more questions will arise about their sustainability,
growth potential, and their distinctive innovational styles. Can a megachurch grow
indefinitely? How are the costs associated with a large congregation comparable to
smaller congregations? Are there really economies of scale to be exploited? These are
questions that have yet to be answered, and though interesting are outside the scope of
this paper. However, following the discussions up to this point, I think the most
important aspect concerning megachurches is to note that they are at their cores
theologically motivated organizations. A comparison can be brought that is opposition to
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my notion of growth incentives; Jewish congregations will purposefully limit their size,
and when they have outgrown a certain size, they are split into separate groups. My
response may seem trivial, but I believe it to be in line with the argument that I have
attempted to convey in this paper. My response is that the Jewish congregation is not a
Christian group, and does not have the same theological incentives. Judaism is not
known as a religion that proselytizes, while Christianity certainly is. Granted, that was a
single case, but what about when comparing other Christian denominations instead of
groups outside the faith? This is not a simple question, but I believe the way that
Christianity has developed can offer something to the discussion. There are over 25,000
Christian denominations28, each with its own unique theological lineage. My argument
attributes part of the success of the megachurch movement to the organization’s ability to
distinguish itself from the mainstream groups, essentially becoming a separate religious
form. With their loose ties to mainline denominations, each megachurch can be viewed
as an independent entity, deciding for itself how to best serve its members and attain long
run goals. It is interesting to think about the future of the megachurch movement and
what will happen if they continue to be successful and innovative. I think that for now,
the megachurches will seek to exploit their current success for as long as possible,
expanding their groups under specific brand identities. However, in the long run, I see
the current mode of action as just a growth phase that this particular type of congregation
has managed to make successful, but just as Christian groups have done for the last 2,000
years, their growth will cease to be a phenomenal oddity or exciting topic of discussion,
and the movement will fade into the mainstream of society with the successful groups
evolving into the denominations they originally were alternatives for.
28
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Currently, the megachurch movement is a new mode of evangelization for the
modern American culture. The often-ridiculed commercialization of religion is
responsible for the spread of religious messages the speed at which they are conveyed, be
it through media (TV, or the internet) or though the ubiquitous contemporary music that
engages and excites people in the megachurches’ services. But the messages being
conveyed are essentially unchanged from the original forms offered in many other
Christian groups; they are for the most part stylistic differences. If the modern cultural
aspects of megachurches are stripped away, the theological core is the same as most other
traditional congregations. This theological core29 is what drives the most basic and longstanding Christian obsession of spreading the “good news” of the religion’s central
figure: “Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations…teaching them to observe all
things that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the
age.” (Matthew 28:19-20)

29

I understand that there is incredible variety within the Christian religion, but for the most part,
the denominations seem to have exhort the same behaviors and values, and much of the
difference comes from specific disagreements on notions as to divinity of Christ, and the
organization of the institution. But, nearly all ascribe final authority to biblical teachings,
especially in the Protestant and Evangelical movements.
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